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1. Parties 
[1] The claimant in this arbitration is Mediterraneo Engineering Co., a 
corporation organized under the laws of Mediterraneo, and located at 
415 lndustrial Street, Capitol City, Mediterraneo (Claimant). 
[2] Claimant is represented in this arbitration by Mr Horace Fasttrack, 
Advocate at the Court, 75 Court Street, Capitol City, Mediterraneo. 
[3] The respondent in this arbitration is Equatoriana Super Pumps S.A., a 
corporation organized under the laws of Equatoriana, and located at 58 
lndustrial Road, Oceanside, Equatoriana (Respondent). 
[4] Respondent is represented by Mr Joseph Langweiler, Lawyer, 14 Capitol 
Boulevard, Oceanside, Equatoriana. 
[5] Claimant and Respondent are together referred to as the 'Parties' in this 
Award. 
II. Arbitration Agreement and Applicable Law 
[6] The present dispute arises out of a contract between the Parties for the 
sale of pumps concluded 1 July 2008 (Contract). 
[7] Clause 18 of the Contract reads as follows: 
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, relating to or in connection 
with this contract, including any question regarding its existence, validity 
or termination, shall be resolved by conciliation in accordance with the 
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules. The parties will be represented by their Chief 
Executive Officer. The conciliation shall take place in Vindobona, Danubia 
and be administered by the Danubia Arbitration and Conciliation Center. 
lf the dispute has not been settled pursuant to the said conciliation 
procedure, the dispute shall be resolved by arbitration in accordance with 
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the ACICAArbitration Rules. The seat of arbitration shall be Vindobona, 
Danubia. The language of the arbitration shall be English. The number 
of arbitrators shall be three. 
[8] As concerns the applicable procedural law the Parties agreed that the 
seat of this arbitration as well as for the conciliation shall be Danubia. The 
/ex arbitrithus is the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, including the 2006 Amendments, as it has been enacted in 
Danubia (UNCITRAL Model Law). Furthermore, Danubia has enacted 
the UNCITRAL Model Law an International Conciliation which therefore 
governs the conciliation procedure. The Parties have agreed in their 
Contract that conciliation will be conducted according to the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Conciliation. For their arbitration they have chosen the ACICA 
Arbitration Rules (2005)(ACICA Rules). Neither of the Parties has 
disputed the general applicability of these laws and rules. Furthermore, 
as Mediterraneo and Equatoriana are both parties to the 1958 New York 
Convention an the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, this Convention might also be taken into consideration where it 
seems appropriate. 
[9] As concerns the applicable substantive law Art. 28(1) UNCITRAL Model 
Law and Art. 34.1 ACICA Rules primarily rely an the law chosen by the 
Parties. In the case at hand there has been no choice of law. According to 
Art. 28(2) UNICITRAL Model Law the tribunal must therefore determine 
the applicable law according to the conflict of laws rules, whereas 
pursuant to Art. 34.1 ACICA Rules the tribunal is to select the law which 
it considers applicable. As both Parties have their places of businesses 
in States that are] Contracting States of the CISG it seems appropriate 
to apply the CISG to this contract (Art. 1 (1 )(a) CISG). This is the law 
that is most closely connected to the Contract and that would also be 
designated by Danubian law. None of the Parties has objected to the 
application of the CISG. As concerns matters not governed by the CISG 
the Tribunal considers it appropriate to apply the laws of Equatoriana as 
the law of the seller's place of business, which has the closest relation to 
the sales contract. 
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III. Arbitral Tribunal 
[1 O] The Tribunal was constituted on 18 September 2009 as a panel of three 
members: 
Prof. Dr Ingeborg Schwenzer (Chairperson), University of Basel, Peter 
Merian-Weg 8, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland; 
Dr Lisa Spagnolo, Faculty of Law, Commercial Law Group, Monash 
University, Wellington Road, Clayton, 3800 Australia; 
Dr Claudio Finkelstein, Pontifical Catholic University, Rua Monte Alegre, 
984, 4 andar, SP, Brazil]. 
[11] Dr Lisa Spagnolo was appointed to the Tribunal by Claimant on 15 July 
2009 in a letter filed before ACICA. Dr Claudio Finkelstein was appointed 
by the Respondent in its letter submitted to ACICA on 17 August 2009. 
[12] In accordance with Art. 10.1 ACICA Rules it was agreed by the two party-
appointed arbitrators that Prof Dr Ingeborg Schwenzer should serve as 
Chairperson. Prof Schwenzer agreed to the appointment which was 
communicated to ACICA by Dr Spagnolo on 18 September 2009. 
[13] lt should be noted that Dr Spagnolo notified counsel for Respondent on 18 
September 2009 that she had previously been appointed as an arbitrator 
by counsel for the Claimant in an arbitration before the Mediterraneo 
Arbitration Centre, but had no other contact with Mr Fasttrack or the 
Claimant. 
IV. Arbitral Proceedings 
[14] On 15 July 2009 Claimant filed before ACICA its Notice of Arbitration 
and Statement of Claim dated 15 July 2009 and thus commenced the 
proceedings of this arbitration. 
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[15] By letter dated 20 July 2009, the ACICA Secretary General indicated that 
the proposed seat of arbitration, Vindobona, Danubia, was acceptable to 
ACICA. 
· [16] On 17 August 2009 Respondent submitted to ACICA an Answer to Notice 
of Arbitration and Statement of Defense dated 17 August 2009. 
[17] The Respondent served two Witness Statements with ACICA with its 
Answer to Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Defense as follows: 
(a) Mr Horace Wilson, Procurement Officer, Oceania Water 
Services dated 9 August 2009 (Respondent Exhibit No 2 (Resp 
Ex #2)); 
(b) Mr James Fisher, Sales Manager, Trading Company of 
Mediterraneo dated 10 August 2009 (Resp Ex #3). 
[18] On 2 September 2009 Claimant filed with ACICA a Reply to Answer 
dated 2 September 2009. 
[19] On 16 September 2009 Respondent indicated to ACICA it did not wish to 
comment on Claimant's Reply to Answer. 
[20] On 2 October 2009 pursuant to Art. 17.3 ACICA Rules, the Chairperson 
convened a conference call to discuss the procedure, during which the 
Parties reached an agreement on preliminary issues concerning the 
conduct of the arbitration. 
[21] Based on discussions of the same date, on 2 October 2009 Procedural 
Order No 1 was issued by the Tribunal, confirming the agreement of the 
Parties that: 
(a) the arbitration was to be conducted in two stages (Procedural 
Order No 1 [1]-[3] (PO #1)): 
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(i) a first stage dealing with issues of jurisdiction, breach of 
contract and mitigation; and 
(ii) a second stage dealing with relief, including calculation 
of damages, interest and costs; 
(b) Parties would exchange written memoranda of their submissions, 
with Claimant submitting by 3 December 2009, and Respondent 
by 21 January 2010 (PO #1 [5]); 
(c) oral hearings would occur in Vindobona, Danubia, from 26 
March to 1 April 2010 (PO #1 [7]). 
[22] On 29 October 2009 Procedural Order No 2 was issued by the Tribunal 
in response to queries of the Parties invited by the Chairperson in 
Procedural Order No 1 [4]. lt directed that, in relation to the merits, the 
Parties were to address all matters concerning Respondent's obligation 
including arguments concerning the excuse of any consequences. 
Additionally, other more specific matters were also addressed. 
[23] Written memoranda of submissions were served by Claimant on 3 
December 2009, and by Respondent by 21 January 2010. 
[24] Oral hearings took place in Vindobona, Danubia from 27 March to 1 April 
2010 in accordance with Procedural Order No 1 [7]. 
[25] Following the oral hearings the Parties were invited to make further 
written submissions. Counsel for both Parties submitted these to the 
Tribunal on 4 April 2010. On 5 April 2010, after consultation with the 
Parties, the proceedings were closed by the Tribunal. 
V. Factual Background 
[26] Claimant is a Mediterraneo company engaged in planning and 
implementing rural and urban development projects in Mediterraneo and 
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elsewhere. Respondent is a corporation which manufactures pumps in 
Equatoriana, and supplies them to more than 50 countries, including 
Mediterraneo. Two years earlier it had supplied pumps to Claimant for 
an irrigation project in Patria. 
1. The Project Contract 
[27] A call for tenders for a project for renewal of an irrigation system located 
in Oceania was issued by government authority, Oceania Water Services 
(Water Services). On 4 May 2008 Mr Samuel Barber, director of Claimant 
entered into phone discussions with Mr Richard Haycock, Respondent's 
sales manager, to discuss Claimant's proposed bid. A letter by Mr Barber 
to Mr Haycock the following day, 5 May 2008 (Claimant Exhibit No 1 (Cl 
Ex #1 }), confirmed the irrigation project would be 'to furnish and install 
new pumps and to do other associated work', similar to the earlier Patria 
project, and that Claimant anticipated working on the bid with Respondent 
and purchasing the pumps from it should the bid succeed. 
[28] Subsequently, Respondent reviewed the proposed bid, and suggested 
the type of pumps necessary and their prices. A draft contract of sale for 
such pumps was prepared and signed by Claimant contingent on the 
success of Claimant's bid. 
[29] Claimant's bid was successful and Claimant was awarded the contract 
with Water Services to renew the irrigation project in Oceania (Project 
Contract). The Project Contract did not specify from which supplier 
Claimant should obtain pumps, and provided for penalties for delays 
in overall project completion (Procedural Order No 2 [8], [22] (PO #2)). 
Although the Project Contract did not stipulate the pumps were to be 
new rather than used, Water Services anticipated they wou ld be newly 
manufactured (PO #2 [25]). 
[30] On 25 June 2008 the director of Claimant, Mr Barber, informed 
Respondent's sales manager, Mr Haycock, of the successful bid by 
phone, and mentioned Claimant's obligation to deliver the pumps to the 
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project site by 2 January 2009 (PO #2 [14]). On the same day, Claimant 
in a letter sent by email 25 June 2008 (Cl Ex #2), sought to 'underline the 
importance of meeting the delivery date called for in the contract (which 
remains the same as that in the draft contract). [The Project Contract] 
has strict performance times with substantial penalties attached to delays 
and any delay in your delivery of the pumps would endanger our ability 
to meet at least some of the performance times. The people in Oceania 
are nervous about the political situation, which is leading them tobe very 
strict in ensuring that all will be done properly'. 
2. The Pumps Contract 
[31] The contract in question in this arbitration is that entered between 
Claimant and Respondent for the sale of pumps (Contract). The draft 
contract prepared earlier was signed by Respondent's representative 
on 1 July 2008 (Cl Ex #3). lt contained terms including the following 
clauses: 
1. [Respondent] hereby sells to [Claimant] the pumps from its N 
series as described in Annex 1 together with three P-52 pumps 
for a total price of US$1,214,550 DES (Incoterms 2000) Capitol 
City, Mediterraneo. Delivery is to be in a single shipment and 
effected by 15 December 2008. The pumps are for installation 
in Oceania by [Claimant] under the contract between it and 
Oceania Water Services signed 25 June 2008 for the irrigation 
project IR 08-450. 
2. The pumps shall meet the technical specifications set out in 
Annex 1. [Respondent] warrants that the pumps are in compliance 
with all relevant regulations for importation into Mediterraneo 
and for use in Oceania. 
3. Payment to be made against documentary credit subject to UCP 
600 issued by a first class bank. 
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[32] Annex 1 contained specifications relating to the pump type, power and 
efficiency, but not composition of the steel used in their manufacture (PO 
#2 [6]). 
[33] Respondent had several P-52 pumps in inventory at the time the 
contract was signed an 1 July 2008. lt informed Claimant of this in 
a letter dated 1 July 2008 sent by courier and email (Resp Ex #1 ), 
stating '[p ]articularly in light of the imperative nature of the delivery 
dates, which you emphasize in your letter, it is fortunate that we have 
several P-52 pumps in inventory ready for shipment. As you may well 
imagine, a pump of its size and complexity takes considerable time 
to manufacture'. Respondent was aware the P-52 pumps would be 
installed in a pump hause (PO #2 [7]). 
3. Oceania 1 August Regulation 
[34] Respondent normally used Equatoriana steel to manufacture its pumps. 
Traces of beryllium are present in all Equatoriana iron ores, and while it 
can be eliminated during ore refinement or steel production, since it is 
a natural hardening agent, this would necessitate replacement with an 
alternative imported hardening agent. Consequently beryllium is normally 
not removed by Equatoriana steel producers. 
[35] On 1 August 2008, a month after the Parties entered the Contract, 
Water Services informed Claimant of a new Oceania regulation effective 
immediately restricting use of beryllium _in steel products with moving 
parts to be used in enclosed spaces (Cl Ex #4) (1 August Regulation). 
Claimant notified Respondent by email the same day, enclosing a copy of 
the Water Services notice (Cl Ex #5). lt noted that if there were beryllium 
in Equatoriana steel Respondent would 'have to find steel from some 
other source in producing those pumps'. lt is common ground that the 
1 August Regulation affected the P-52 pumps but not the field pumps 
(Statement of Claim [11] (SoC); Statement of Defense [11] (SoD)), since 
only P-52 pumps were to be enclosed in a pump hause. 
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[36] In its emailed letter to Claimant dated 2 August 2008 (Cl Ex #6), 
Respondent stated that it had previously 'expected to have completed 
the manufacture of the pumps by 30 October [2008]' but the need to 
procure and import new steel for manufacture of P-52s due to the 1 
August Regulation would cause delay in completion by 'several weeks' 
and an 'increase in costs of approximately US$30,000'. lt further declared 
'we cannot be held responsible for the delay in shipping the pumps to 
you. Moreover, we cannot be expected to absorb the extra expense 
caused by the completely unforeseen change in the regulations ... [as] 
we have no direct relationship with Oceania and had no reason to be 
monitoring political or regulatory developments, as you have'. Claimant, 
being located in a country contiguous to Oceania, was more aware of 
developments than Respondent, but did not know of plans to restrict 
beryllium in metal products (PO #2 [5]). 
[37] Respondent imported the beryllium-free steel for manufacture of P-52 
pumps. Once confident production would be complete by 15 November 
2008, Respondent contacted a freight forwarder. The first available ship 
scheduled for Capitol City, Mediterraneo after 15 November 2008 was 
the 'Merry Queen' which was due to leave on 22 November 2008. A week 
between production and shipping was normally required for packing into 
a container, transport and loading. The pumps were loaded onto the 
'Merry Queen' by 20 November 2008 (PO #2 [12]). 
[38] On 22 November 2008, Respondent advised Claimant by email of the 
anticipated arrival in Mediterraneo on 22 December 2008, 'a week 
later than originally anticipated' (Cl Ex #7). lt was common ground this 
would still allow sufficient time for Claimant to transport the pumps to the 
project site in neighbouring Oceania in time to meet the Project Contract 
schedule (Cl Ex #7, SoD [12]), which required delivery to the project site 
in Oceania by 2 January 2009 (Cl Ex #12).· Claimant responded on 24 
November 2008 by email stating '[w]e realize that there is little that can 
be done about it now, so we have to go along with you', that the schedule 
'will be very tight' and '[a]ny further delays and the entire irrigation project 
may be at risk' (Cl Ex #8). 
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4. The Shipping Accident 
[39] The 'Merry Queen' left port on 22 November 2008 (PO #2 [12]). However, 
the ship did not arrive at the port of Capitol City, Mediterraneo as expected 
on 22 December 2008. Another ship caused extensive damage to the 
locks in the Isthmus Canal on 28 November 2008, the day before the 
ship carrying the pumps was due to transit the canal on 29 November 
2008 (Cl Ex #7). Ships had been delayed in the Isthmus Canal before, 
but it was a rare occurrence (PO #2 [13]). 
[40] Respondent notified Claimant on the day of the accident (Cl Ex #9), 
reporting that it had enquired whether a longer reute might be taken to 
avoid the Canal, but had been told this would take much langer than the 
lock repairs. lt would have been almest impossible to transfer the pumps 
to another ship going around the continent, and this would not have led 
to earlier arrival in Mediterraneo in any event (PO #2 [14]). The lock 
repairs took 10 days, and the backlog of ships awaiting passage through 
the canal created further delay. Consequently, the 'Merry Queen' did not 
make its way through the canal until 12 December 2008 (Cl Ex #10), and 
did not arrive at its destination until 6 January 2009. 
[41] On 24 November 2008 Respondent received payment of the price 
of US$1,214,550 pursuant to a letter of credit upon presentation of 
the required documents following the ship's departure but before its 
arrival on 6 January 2009 (SoC [13], Respondent Post-Hearing Further 
Memorandum). 
5. The Change of Government in Oceania 
[42] On 1 December, while the pumps were still in transit, the Oceania 
government resigned and a military regime took power. The Military 
Council, which still retains power, took the following steps: 
(a) 28 December Decree Prohibiting Import of Products 
Containing Beryllium The Military Council passed a decree on , 
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28 December 2008, effective 1 January 2009, prohibiting import 
of any products containing beryllium (28 December Decree). 
Claimant advised Respondent on the same day (Cl Ex #11), 
stating individual applications for an exception 'will have to be 
made to an office that is tobe established'. 
(b) Cancellation Policy for Foreign Supply Contracts in Breach 
Furthermore, the Military Council cancelled various projects and 
instructed government departments administering projects to 
cancel contracts with foreign suppliers who were in breach, on 
grounds of breach (Cl Ex #12). 
[43] On 28 December 2008 in an emailed letter Claimant informed Respondent 
(Cl Ex #11) that in a phone call earlier that day to Mr Barber, Mr Horace 
Wilson, Water Services procurement officer, had said 'it was vital for the 
pumps to be in Oceania by midnight of 31 December [2008]' and when 
told of the 6 January 2009 arrival, had said he had 'no idea what the 
consequences' might be. However, in a Witness Statement submitted by 
Respondent (Resp Ex #2), Mr Wilson says when told of the 6 January 
arrival date, he answered 'that was too late', and he had 'urged Mr 
Barber to see whether he could do anything'. He also adds in his Witness 
Statement that the 'contract was in serious danger of being cancelled' 
but it would 'help if there could be at least partial delivery of pumps that 
would conform to the contract by 2 January'. 
[44] In another Witness Statement filed by Respondent (Resp Ex #3), Sales 
Manager of Trading Company of Mediterraneo, Mr James Fisher, states 
that from 12 November 2008 through to April 2009, his company had 
28 used pumps in stock which would have met the specifications for 
some of the pumps required by the Project Contract, and that these 
were located in Gotham, Mediterraneo, on the border of Oceania, so 
could have been delivered within 36 hours. The pumps were only slightly 
used, contained no beryllium or other elements mentioned in the 28 
December Decree, and would have been acceptable to Water Services 
(PO #2 [25]). According to Mr Fisher, the pumps were advertised for 
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sale on the company website, but he was not contacted by Claimant. 
While several Claimant personnel including Mr Haycock were aware 
of Trading Company of Mediterraneo, Claimant had never previously 
purchased from or seid to it. lndeed, Respondent had never heard of it 
before preparing its case for arbitration (PO #2 [23], [24]). Claimant had 
sufficient financial resources to purchase such pumps (PO #2 [26]). 
[45] Although prior to 5 January 2009 Claimant had considered applying 
for an exception to the 28 December Decree, it did not do so, since it 
estimated chances would be slim that the submissions office would be 
established quickly and grant approval (PO #2 [21]). The submissions 
office was not in operation until 2 March 2009, and by 16 April 2009, had 
approved 27 of the 73 outstanding applications (PO #2 [20]). 
[46] On 5 January 2009 Water Services notified Claimant that it had cancelled 
the irrigation project immediately on grounds that the pumps had not 
been delivered to the project site by 2 January 2009 as required by the 
Project Contract (Cl Ex #12). Water Services did not refer to any potential 
violation of the 28 December Decree, but did refer to the Military Council's 
cancellation policy for foreign party supply contracts in breach. 
[47] On the same day, Claimant notified Respondent of the Project Contract 
cancellation and the grounds given by Water Services, but commented 
that this was 'only an excuse'. In that emailed letter, dated 5 January 
2009 (Cl Ex #13), Claimant purported to avoid the Contract, saying that, 
given cancellation of the Project Contract 'we have no further use for the 
pumps that are now due to arrive in port tomorrow. Consequently, we are 
in turn forced to cancel our contract with you'. lt requested return of the 
purchase price by documentary credit, indicated it might seek damages 
from Respondent for lass of the Project Contract, and sought instructions 
for the pumps' disposal, offering to store them for Respondent's account. 
[48] By letter dated 15 January 2009 to Respondent (Cl Ex #14), counsel for 
Claimant asserted that the Contract had been avoided, and demanded 
US$320,000 in damages for cancellation of the Project Contract on the , 
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grounds it resulted directly from Respondent's alleged breach of the 
Contract. Return of the price of US$1,214,550 was also demanded. The 
pumps' storage in Claimant's warehouse was noted, and instructions for 
disposal sought. 
[49] Counsel for Respondent in a letter dated 22 January 2009 (Cl Ex #15) stated 
the pumps were 'regulation compliant for export to Oceania' and the 
'date of the contract is the relevant date for determination whether they 
were regulation compliant'. lt asserted the cause of the delay was the 
change of regulations in Oceania after the contract date. Counsel for 
Respondent also stated that Respondent did 'not expect to pursue its 
claim ... for the US$30,000 in extra costs that it incurred for [Claimant's] 
account ... when it imported steel from outside Equatoriana', and offered 
to assist in the pumps disposal, waiving any sales commission charges 
for doing so. 
[50] The Parties exchanged correspondence via counsel over the next two 
months, both maintaining their positions. In a letter dated 26 January 
2009 (Cl Ex #16), Claimant stated that in the absence of instructions 
within two weeks regarding disposal, it would exercise its rights under 
the CISG to sell the pumps on account of Respondent. Claimant's 
subsequent attempts were unsuccessful. The pumps remain in Claimant's 
warehouse. 
6. Conciliation 
[51] Clause 18 of the Contract provided that '[a]ny dispute, controversy or 
claim arising out of, relating to or in connection with this contract ... 
shall be resolved by conciliation in accordance with the UNCITRAL 
Conciliation Rules'. The Parties attended conciliation at Vindobona from 
28-30 May 2009 during a conference held in Vindobona at that time. 
Respondent was represented by Mr James Stecker, its Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), and Claimant by Mr William Holzer, its Deputy CEO, 
but despite two days of discussions, attempts at conciliation proved 
unsuccessful. Neither party was particularly conciliatory since both were 
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confident of their legal positions arid neither anticipated future business 
dealings with one another. After consulting the Parties, the conciliator 
declared in writing to the Danubia Arbitration and Conciliation Center 
on 4 June 2009 that conciliation efforts were no langer justified (PO #2 
[32]). 
[52] In accordance with Art. 6 UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, names and 
addresses of the Parties' representatives for conciliation had been 
communicated in writing, however, titles were not indicated. Mr Stecker 
did not know the name of Claimant's CEO (PO #2 [31]), and Respondent 
says it only became aware of the fact that Mr Holzer was not the CEO 
of Claimant a week after conciliation, upon checking a list of conference 
participants received 28 May 2009 containing Mr Holzer's position and 
title (SoD [7], PO #2 [29]). 
[53] Claimant's CEO did not attend the conference or conciliation as his 
daughter was getting married on 29 May 2009 (PO #2 [30]). Mr Holzer 
is in charge of internal operations and exercised other duties delegated 
to him by Claimant's CEO (PO #2 [28]). Claimant states Mr Holzer was 
'acting with the authority' of the CEO and had 'full authority to represent' 
Claimant at the conciliation (Reply to Answer [1]). 
VI. Parties' Requests for Relief 
[54] Claimant has requested the Tribunal to: 
(a) find it has jurisdiction to consider this dispute; 
(b) find that Respondent breached the contract; 
(c) find the breach by Respondent constituted a fundamental 
breach; 
( d) declare that Claimant properly avoided the contract; 
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(e) order Respondent to reimburse Claimant for the purchase price 
of US$1 ,214,550; 
(f) order Respondent to pay Claimant damages in the amount of 
US$320,000; 
(g) order Respondent to pay interest on the sums in (e) and (f); 
(h) award Claimant its costs of arbitration. 
[55] Respondent requests the Tribunal to: 
(a) declare it has no jurisdiction in this dispute; 
(b) or, in the alternative, to find Respondent was not in breach of its 
contract with Claimant; 
(c) or, in the alternative, to find Claimant did not take the actions it 
should have taken to avoid or minimize adverse consequences; 
(d) to award Respondent its costs of arbitration. 
VII. lssues, Position of the Parties, and Tribunal's Findings and Decisions 
A. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
[56] The Parties disagree on whether this Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the case. 
1. Respondent's Position 
[57] lt is Respondent's position that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction 
to hear the case and should therefore close the arbitral proceedings. 
Alternatively, Respondent asks the Tribunal to stay the proceedings 
pending conciliation. According to Respondent conciliation is a pre-
condition to arbitration and was not properly conducted. 
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[58] Respondent alleges that conciliation was a compulsory measure to be 
taken before this arbitration. Respondent argues that the term shall 
was used in the arbitration agreement rather than the permissive term 
may, which suggests that conciliation was a mandatory pre-condition 
to these arbitration proceedings. This is furthermore underlined by the 
qualification that arbitration should only be conducted if the dispute had 
not been settled pursuant to the conciliation procedure. 
[59] According to Respondent, Claimant has failed to fulfill this pre-condition. 
[60] First, Respondent argues that Claimant has not adhered to this procedure 
as it was represented in the conciliation by its Deputy CEO instead of its 
CEO (above [51]). Clause 18 of the Contract required that both parties 
be represented by their CEOs and did not allow for any delegation. 
[61] Second, even iftheclause permitted delegation, accordingto Respondent, 
Claimant's Deputy CEO was an unfit representative. In order to facilitate 
negotiations that might reach an effective conciliation agreement it was 
necessary for both parties tobe represented by persons with the ultimate 
power to settle. The CEO is the highest ranking employee with the widest 
authority and, thus, possesses the judgment necessary to maximize the 
prospectofsettlement. The DeputyCEO, however, had onlybeen granted 
express authority to 'represent' Claimant which did not include authority 
to settle. Claimant's representation was furthermore improper because 
its Deputy CEO was concerned with internal operations (above [53]), and 
not delegated with the full range of the CEO's daily responsibilities and 
powers that would enable it to negotiate in a reasonable manner. Due 
to these specific characteristics of the CEO, no provision in the Contract 
allowing delegation can be implied. 
[62] Thirdly, Respondent submits that the pre-conditions of conciliation have 
not been met by a good faith representation by Claimant's Deputy CEO. 
Claimant had been aware that its CEO would not be able to take part in the 
conciliation in person and still had refrained from notifying Respondent 
about the absence. 
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[63] Finally, Respondent contests that it waived its ability to challenge 
Claimant's improper representation. Respondent had no knowledge of 
the non-compliance at conciliation ( above [52]) and objected without 
undue delay. In fact, Respondent objected immediately upon receiving 
the notice of arbitration, Claimant's first communication with Respondent 
after the conciliation ended (SoD [8]). In addition, Respondent's conduct 
never conceded that Claimant's representation was proper and therefore 
Respondent cannot be estopped from challenging it. 
[64] Consequently, Respondent requests the Tribunal to close these 
proceedings in order that conciliation can be properly conducted. 
2. Claimant's Position 
[65] Claimant alleges that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the dispute. 
Alternatively, should the Tribunal decline jurisdiction at this time, it 
requests the Tribunal to stay the proceedings, but not close them. 
[66] According to Claimant, conciliation was not a mandatory pre-condition. 
In establishing a two-tier dispute resolution process, it is Claimant's 
submission that the first tier merely suggests efforts to achieve an 
amicable settlement should be undertaken. Even if the Tribunal should 
find that conciliation was to be conducted before commencing arbitration 
proceedings Claimant submits that it has sufficiently complied with the 
requirements of conciliation. 
[67] Claimant states that the agreement to conciliate was unenforceable for 
lack of sufficient certainty. Clause 18 containing the agreement fixed no 
time at which efforts at conciliation could be regarded as exhausted, 
thus creating the risk that Claimant would be precluded from access to 
arbitration for an indefinite time. 
[68] Should the Tribunal consider differently, it is Claimant's submission that 
it properly fulfilled the pre-requisite to conciliate. 
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[69] First, by drafting the arbitration agreement as a two-tiered dispute 
resolution clause the parties sought to create an effective dispute 
settlement mechanism that would allow for greater flexibility in resolving 
the dispute. The arbitration agreement must therefore be interpreted 
giving it effet utile, meaning that it sufficed for Claimant to be represented 
by an officer with the full authority of its CEO and not necessarily the 
CEO itself. 
[70] Secondly, Claimant submits that it cannot be precluded from arbitration 
as it acted in good faith by participating in conciliation. lndeed, it was 
Claimant that suggested in the first place that the parties conciliate (SoC 
[23]). Claimant fully participated with Respondent for two full days of 
conciliatory discussions before finally requesting arbitration. 
[71] Thirdly, according to Claimant its Deputy CEO acted effectively as the 
CEO's agent with the CEO's full authority. 
[72] Finally, Claimant alleges that Respondent failed to challenge Claimant's 
representation at the conciliation thereby waiving its right to do so 
thereafter Respondent received a copy of the list of participants to the 
conference containing the Deputy CEO's name and title when registering 
at the conference on the day conciliation began on 28 March 2009 (above 
52). lt thus could have raised an objection at any stage during the two 
days of conciliation. In refraining from doing so it effectively waived its 
right to challenge Claimant's representation at the conciliation in any 
subsequent arbitration. 
[73] Alternatively, if the Tribunal finds that Claimant did not fulfill a required 
pre-arbitral step, it is Claimant's position that it should not in any event 
invalidate the arbitration agreement. Even if it does not satisfy the pre-
condition for arbitration under clause 18 of the Contract, the conciliation 
was already unsuccessful, and the matter has not been settled since, 
which demonstrates that both parties were non-conciliatory (above [51]). 
Also, to close the arbitral proceedings at this point would be costly and 
cause undue delay, and therefore be contrary to the parties' interests. 
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[7 4] Hence, Claimant alleges that the Tribunal should consider further 
conciliation futile and proceed to hear the merits of the dispute. 
3. The Tribunal's findings and decision 
[75] The Tribunal has carefully reviewed all of the submissions in relation to 
this issue and rules that it has jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 
· [76] In accordance with the principle of competence-competence the 
Tribunal has the power to decide upon its own jurisdiction. This power 
also encompasses the question whether any possible pre-conditions to 
arbitrate were fulfilled by the parties. 
[77] The Tribunal has jurisdiction. The Tribunal agrees that conciliation was 
a pre-condition to arbitration. However, this pre-condition to conciliate 
was properly fulfilled by the representation of the Claimant by its Deputy 
CEO. 
[78] Conciliation was a pre-condition to arbitration in the case at hand. This 
finding is supported by the clear wording of the arbitration agreement. 
As the intent of the parties is paramount to any arbitration proceedings, 
regard must first be had to the wording of the arbitration agreement. 
Clause 18 states '[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, relating 
to or in connection with this contract, including any question regarding 
its existence, validity or termination, shall be resolved by conciliation in 
accordance with the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules' (emphasis added). 
Further, it is only '[i]f the dispute has not been settled pursuant to the 
said conciliation procedure, [that] the dispute shall be resolved by 
arbitration in accordance with the ACICA Arbitration Rules' (emphasis 
added). The use of the mandatory term shal/, meaning that the parties 
not only may, but instead must conduct conciliation, in connection with 
the unambiguous instruction to turn to arbitration only if conciliation has 
failed lead to the conclusion that conciliation constituted a binding pre-
requisite to arbitration (Berger, (2006) 22 Arbitration International 1 at 4). 
216 
XVII VIS MDDT - 2009-1 0 - PUMPS 
[79] Also, the Tribunal rejects Claimant's argument that the agreement to 
conciliate is indefinite and therefore unenforceable due to its failure to 
fix a time at which to terminate the conciliation efforts (above [67]). The 
purpose of requiring clarity in such an agreement is to protect parties 
using a two-tiered escalation clause from uncertainty, and to provide 
them with clear rules as to how the dispute is to be settled. In order 
to achieve this aim an agreement to conciliate does not necessarily 
have to fix express time limits. Rather, the clarity requirement is met 
when the agreement sets clear indicators for ending conciliation and 
beginning arbitration. Although the Parties' conciliation agreement 
does not itself specify any time limits, reference is made to the 
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (above [7]) which provide for an ending 
of the conciliation procedure via termination by the conciliator (Art. 
15(b) UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules), or by termination by the parties, 
either jointly (Art. 15(c) UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules) or unilaterally 
(Art. 15(d) UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules) thereby giving the Parties 
sufficient clarity as to when the conciliation procedure is terminated. In 
this case, the conciliator affirmed that further efforts were futile (above 
[51 ]). This being a clear indicator that the conciliation phase has ended, 
and it was permissible for the Parties to proceed to arbitration. 
[80] The Tribunal therefore comes to the conclusion that conciliation was 
a mandatory pre-condition to be conducted before initiating arbitral 
proceedings. 
[81] Further, Claimant effectively participated in conciliation by sending its 
Deputy CEO to conciliate the dispute. The purpose of a conciliation clause 
requiring parties to be represented by their Chief Executive Officers, is 
to ensure that the conciliation is effective and the dispute is settled by 
those who have the knowledge, the power and the authority to enter a 
valid conciliation agreement. Thus, giving effect to the aim underlying 
the conciliation clause at hand, the clause must be interpreted to allow a 
representation either by the parties' CEOs or by such persons who were 
capable of effectively representing the CEO. 
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[82] The Deputy CEO had the full authority to represent Claimant in the 
conciliation (above [53]) and if an agreement had been reached, there 
is no evidence to suggest he would have lacked power and authority 
to validly bind Claimant. To the contrary, once a representative of the 
CEO is present, having the same powers as the CEO himself, granted 
in an autonomous and valid document (i.e. a Power of Attorney), then 
the grantor of such power, for any practical purpose, is present in and 
for that particular act. This Tribunal has held in Procedural Order No 2 
[28], that the powers were delegated to Claimant's Deputy CEO by its 
CEO, therefore the Tribunal now determines that the CEO was present 
at conciliation by virtue of the Deputy CEO's presence, and the fact he 
was present by means of someone with representative powers to act 
on his behalf did not breach a material requirement of the Contract, 
irrespective of the inexistence of a specific clause within the Contract 
allowing delegation of powers for this purpose. 
[83] Therefore, by sending its Deputy CEO to represent Claimant in the 
conciliation procedure Claimant effectively participated in the conciliation 
and hence, met the pre-requisite to arbitration. Case law supports this 
finding. As was held in the ICC Case No. 9977 formal descriptions within 
'a prior mandatory process' such as 'description of representatives, 
timing provisions, formal encounters' are not 'of the essence' but rather 
'imply an attitude and behavior of the parties inspired in a true and honest 
purpose of reaching an agreement'. 
[84] Secondly, Claimant did not act in bad faith when sending its Deputy 
CEO instead of its CEO to conciliate the dispute. At hand, Claimant 
had invited Respondent to conciliate the dispute in the first place 
(SoC [23]). Also, although neither party was 'particularly conciliatory' 
(above [51 ]), their discussions took two full days, hence leading to 
the conclusion that both at least showed some effort to reach an 
agreement. Claimant's Deputy CEO was present in and for the entire 
conciliation procedure and never at any time concealed his position of 
Deputy CEO. He was attending the same conference (on the 'Future 
of Irrigation') where all conference attendees were informed of his 
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title (above [52]). Most of all, if an agreement to settle the case were 
to have been reached during conciliation, he had full power and 
authority to enter into it and bind Claimant. The representation was 
indeed proper for the particular requirement of the Contract. The fact 
that Respondent may have been unaware Mr Holtzer was not the 
CEO does not alter this conclusion. 
[85] Therefore, no evidence supports the assertion that Claimant acted in 
bad faith by sending its Deputy CEO to the conciliation. 
[86] Finally, the Tribunal addresses Claimant's submission that Respondent 
waived its right to object to Claimant's participation at the conciliation by 
not objecting at the time of the conciliation. Because the Tribunal has 
found that the conciliation was properly conducted by the participation of 
Claimant's Deputy CEO and arbitration has been rightfully commenced 
at this time, we leave the issue of waiver open as it would have no effect 
on our finding of jurisdiction in this case. 
[87] In view of the above theArbitral Tribunal determines that it has jurisdiction 
to hear the merits of this case. 
8. Substantive Law lssues 
1. Claimant's Right to Avoid the Contract 
[88] lt is Claimant's case that Respondent breached the Contract because 
(a) the pumps were not in conformity with the Contract, and (b) delivery 
was too late. lt alleges that this amounted to a fundamental breach 
of contract giving rise to Claimant's right to avoid the contract and 
as a consequence giving Claimant the right to reimbursement of the 
purchase price. 
[89] Respondent denies that it breached the Contract in the first place, and 
the existence of a fundamental breach in the second. 
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(a) Non-conformity of the pumps delivered 
i. Claimant's position 
[90] lt is Claimant's position that the pumps did not conform to the Contract 
according to Art. 35 CISG because the pumps contained beryllium and 
therefore did not comply with the public law requirements as they existed 
in Oceania at the date of delivery. 
·· [91] Primarily, Claimant is relying on Art. 35(1) CISG arguing that Clause 
2 in the Contract 'Equatoriana Super Pumps warrants that the pumps 
are in compliance with all relevant regulations for importation into 
Mediterraneo and for use in Oceania' (above [31]) must be construed 
such that the pumps not only had to comply with all regulations at the 
time of contracting but rather with all regulations at the time of (actual) 
delivery which occurred on 6 January 2009. As of 1 January 2009 the 
import of all products containing any amounts of - among other things 
- beryllium was prohibited in Oceania. lt argues that this is in line with 
the DES Incoterms 2000 clause that the Parties provided for in clause 1 
of their Contract (above [31]). Claimant argues that Respondent bears 
the risk of any change of the relevant public law requirements because 
under the DES clause risk of lass does not pass to the buyer prior to 
delivery at the port of destination - here Capitol City - which took place 
on 6 January 2009. 
[92] Alternatively, Claimant wants to rely on Art. 35(2)(b) CISG alleging 
that the pumps were not fit for the special purpose intended for under 
the Contract, namely to be used in the irrigation project in Oceania 
that Claimant had contracted for under the Project Contract. As 
Respondent knew that the pumps were to be used for installation 
in Oceania (above [27]-[30]) it should be held to observe all public 
law requirements of Oceania, even those implemented after the 
conclusion of the contract (SoC [28], Claimant Memorandum [62](CI 
Mem)). 
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ii. Respondent's position 
[93] Respondent alleges that it had no obligation to deliver pumps 
compliant with regulations at the date of delivery and that therefore 
the goods were conforming to the Contract under Art. 35 CISG. 
[94] lt is Respondent's position that according toArt. 35(1) CISG it was merely 
obliged to deliver pumps that were compliant to public law requirements 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract. lt thereby mainly relies on 
the wording of the contractual warranty according to which Respondent 
'warrants that the pumps are in compliance with all relevant regulations' 
(above [31]). In its view the use of the DES Incoterms 2000 clause does 
not change this result as risk of lass is only concerned with lass of or 
damage to the goods but not with change of public regulations (SoD [1 O], 
Respondent Memorandum [61] (Resp Mem)). 
[95] Respondent further denies that it was obliged to deliver pumps compliant 
with regulations at the date of delivery under Art. 35(2)(b) CISG. First, it 
argues that the Oceania's 28 December Decree was made known not 
only after the conclusion of the Contract, but even after delivery of the 
goods (Resp Mem [72]). Second, it alleges that Claimant did not rely on 
Respondent's skill and judgment or that it was at least unreasonable to 
do so (Resp Mem [7 4]). 
[96] The fact that Respondent after the conclusion of the Contract 
agreed to comply with the 1 August Regulation change is seen by 
Respondent as a modification of the contract, whereas no further 
such modification was agreed to after the 28 December Decree 
(SoD [11 ], Resp Mem [49]). Furthermore, Respondent argues 
that Claimant's early payment of the full purchase price following 
shipment evidenced its acceptance of the goods complying to the 
Contract (above [41], Resp Mem [76]). 
[97] Finally, it is Respondent's position that even if the goods were not 
in conformity with the Contract it was exempted under Art. 79 CISG 
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as the 28 December Decree amounted to an impediment beyond its 
control. 
iii. The Tribunal's findings and decision 
[98] The Tribunal has carefully considered all of the submissions in relation 
to this issue. lt comes to the conclusion that the pumps delivered were in 
conformity with the Contract. 
[99] In determining what the Contract calls for under Art. 35(1) CISG the first 
consideration is the wording of the Contract. As the Contract itself did 
not contain any technical specifications as to the question whether the 
steel used for the pumps might contain beryllium or not, it is decisive how 
the sentence 'Equatoriana Super Pumps warrants that the pumps are in 
compliance with all relevant regulations for importation into Mediterraneo 
and for use in Oceania' is tobe interpreted. lt is tobe noted that this is not 
a case about which public law requirements the goods must comply with. 
The clause clearly refers to those of Mediterraneo and Oceania. Rather 
the crucial question is the relevant date for determining the relevant 
regulations. 
[100] According to Art. 8(1) and (2) CISG the contract must be interpreted 
according to the common intent of the Parties and if no such common intent 
can be established, according to the understanding that a reasonable 
person would have had in the same circumstances. According to Art. 
8(3) CISG due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances 
of the case. The starting point - as in all domestic legal systems - is 
the wording of the contract (Schmidt-Kesse/, in Schwenzer (ed.), 
Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods, 3rd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2010), Art. 8 [13]; Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat (Al 
CONF. 97/5), Official Records, 14-66, Art. 7 [5]). As Respondent rightly 
pointed out, the Parties used the present, not the future tense, i.e. 'are' 
instead of 'will be' in compliance. A literal interpretation thus indicates 
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that only compliance with the public law requirements at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract could be expected by a reasonable person. 
Since Claimant suggested the content of the clause and Respondent 
drafted it, the clause has been negotiated between the Parties and hence 
there is no room for any interpretation contra proferentem. 
This interpretation is reinforced by the considerations underlying Art. 
42 CISG which stipulates the seller's liability in relation to third parties' 
intellectual property rights. This provision is often referred to where the 
seller's liability for public law requirements is at stake ( Schwenzer, in 
Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Art. 35 [17 et seq.]). Although primarily cited 
to determine which public law requirements are to be applied Art. 42 
CISG may also be considered when the relevant time is in question. 
According to Art. 42(1) CISG the seller is only liable for those intellectual 
property rights which it knew or could not have been unaware of at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract. The same reasoning must apply as 
regards public law requirements. lf one were to hold the seller liable for 
any later changes of regulations the seller would not be able to estimate 
the possible costs. 
[101] Other circumstances also support this finding instead of contradicting 
it. First, the choice of DES Incoterms 2000 cannot be interpreted in 
the sense that the seller assumes the risk for any change of public 
law requirements until delivery of the goods in the port of destination. 
Provisions on risk of lass are designed to distribute the risk of lass of or 
damage to the goods between seller and buyer. These are lasses that 
can be insured against by either seller or buyer. Although it is discussed 
whether state action may also be subsumed under the provisions of risk 
of loss (Hager/Schmidt-Kessel, in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, Art. 66 
[5]) this only relates to cases of embargo, seizure and the like, not to 
changes of regulations affecting the conformity of the goods. 
[102] According to Art. 8(3) CISG subsequent conduct of the Parties may 
also be taken into account when interpreting the Contract. The 1 
August Regulation restricted the use of beryllium for products to be . 
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used in enclosed spaces. Respondent was willing to adjust the pumps 
accordingly (above [36]). However, it announced that 'there will be an 
increase in costs of approximately US$30,000' and 'we cannot be held 
responsible for the delay ... we cannot be expected to absorb the extra 
expense caused by the completely unforeseen change in the regulations 
in Oceania' (above [36]). This evidences Respondent's view that it 
considered the adjustment of the pumps as a modification of the Contract. 
More importantly, this statement was never contradicted by Claimant. lt 
must be inferred from Claimant's silence that it also regarded this to be 
a modification of the Contract, and that it did not expect Respondent to 
be obliged to adjust the pumps to any and all changes of regulations that 
might be issued after the conclusion of the Contract. Claimant knew that 
new P-52s would need tobe manufactured and that this was a significant 
change to the plans for supply on which Respondent had previously been 
proceeding. The fact that Respondent never insisted an Claimant paying 
the additional US$30,000 does not lead to a different result. 
[103] Claimant furthermore wants to rely an Art. 35(2)(b) CISG alleging that it 
was the particular purpose of the Contract that the pumps were to be used 
for the irrigation project and that this implied that they were to comply 
with any later changes of the public law requirements in Oceania. Even 
if one were to concede that suitability for the irrigation project in Oceania 
was the particular purpose that the pumps were intended for, and that 
Claimant insofar as this particular purpose relied an Respondent's skill 
and judgment, the very aim of Art. 35(2)(b) CISG contradicts Claimant's 
position. Again, Art. 35(2)(b) CISG imposes a liability upon the seller as far 
as the particular purpose is made known to it at the time of the conc/usion 
of the contract. lt thus makes sure that at this time the seller may calculate 
its potential risks and may assume or deny liability for such a purpose. 
Holding the seller liable for any future - unpredictable - developments 
would contravene this idea ( Schwenzer, Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, Art. 
35 [23]; Magnus, in Julius von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, Wiener UN-
Kauftecht (CISG), Berlin: Sellier/de Gruyter (2005), Art. 35 [30]). 
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[104] The pumps therefore were in conformity with the Contract as it had 
been amended by the Parties in August 2008. Conformity with the later 
changed regulations was not required under the Contract. 
(b) Late delivery 
i. Claimant's position 
[105] lt is Claimant's position that by delivering the pumps only on 6 January 
2009 Respondent breached its obligation to deliver in time, and that this 
amounted to a fundamental breach of contract giving Claimant the right 
to avoid the contract. Alternatively, it argues that Respondent did not 
deliver within an additional period of time (Nachfrist) set by Claimant. lt 
denies that Respondent is exempted under Art. 79 or Art. 80 CISG. 
ii. Respondent's position 
[106] Respondent disputes that it breached its obligations by delivering the 
pumps on 6 January 2009, arguing that the delivery date had been 
modified by the Parties. Even if one were to assume that delivery on 6 
January 2009 constituted a breach, it nevertheless denies that this breach 
was fundamental. lt argues that a reasonable person at the time of the 
conclusion of the Contract or at the time of the modification of the Contract, 
respectively, could not foresee that late delivery would substantially 
deprive the buyer of what it was entitled to expect under the Contract. As 
late delivery in itself did not amount to a fundamental breach, Respondent 
alleges that Claimant should have set a Nachfrist, which in Respondent's 
view had not been done properly. In any case, Respondent alleges to have 
been exempted under either Art. 79 or Art. 80 CISG for reasons including 
Claimant's failure to make a timely cover purchase. 
iii. The Tribunal's findings and decision 
[107] The Tribunal comes to the conclusion that by delivering on 6 January 
2009 Respondent breached its delivery obligation and that this breach · 
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amounted to a fundamental breach giving rise for Claimant to avoid the 
Contract. 
[108] The original Contract called for delivery on 15 December 2008 DES 
Incoterms 2000 Capitol City, Mediterraneo. After the Contract was 
modified to meet the 1 August Regulation Respondent informed Claimant 
that delivery would be around 22 December 2008, one week later than 
originally anticipated (above [38]). Claimant agreed to this postponement 
in its letter of 24 November 2008 (above [38]) by stating: 'We realize that 
there is little that can be done about it now, so we have to go along with 
you'. lt is Respondent's position that this correspondence did not amount 
to fixing a new delivery date, rather only that a reasonable delivery date 
was called for which would run into early January 2009. 
[109] The question whether the Parties fixed 22 December 2008 as a new 
delivery date must be decided by interpreting the Parties' conduct in view 
of all relevant circumstances including their previous dealings (Art. 8(3) 
CISG). The original Contract called for the delivery date of 15 December 
2008. Upon the amendment of the Contract after 1 August 2008 again, 
Claimant emphasized that '[t]he schedule ... will be very tight and it is 
imperative that we meet that schedule' (above [38]). Having regard to the 
initial Contract and the circumstances surrounding the amendment of the 
Contract a reasonable person would have come to the conclusion that 
the delivery date was postponed by one week to 22 December 2008 but 
not to early January 2009. Thus, Respondent breached its obligation to 
deliver on 22 December 2008. 
'[110] Respondent may not rely onArt. 80 CISG arguing that Claimant caused 
the failure to perform by asking for a modification of the Contract (Resp 
Mem [132] et seq.) as Respondent itself agreed to such a modification. 
Furthermore, Respondent cannot argue that the failure to perform was 
caused by Claimant because Claimant failed to make a timely cover 
purchase (SoD [13]). The facts brought forward by Respondent did 
not convince this Tribunal that Claimant breached its duties to effect 
a timely cover purchase. Not even Respondent who is to be deemed 
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knowledgeable in the trade knew of this alternative supplier prior to 
this arbitration. Claimant had never traded with it and the fact that it 
advertised the availability of used pumps on its website does not make 
this alternative source obvious. Even if one were to accept the arguments 
brought forward by Respondent, in any case these facts only arose after 
the breach had already occurred and thus might only give rise to a breach 
of the duty to mitigate damages by the Claimant under Art. 77 CISG, but 
not to an exemption under Art. 80 CISG. Likewise, even if Respondent 
is exempted under Art. 79 CISG this exemption relates to damages only 
and leaves any other remedies - especially avoidance of the contract -
untouched (Art. 79(5) CISG). 
[111] The delay in delivery amounted to a fundamental breach of contract in 
the sense of Art. 25 CISG giving rise for Claimant to avoid the contract 
under Art. 49(1 )(a) CISG. 
[112] As delivery had not been effected in due time, on 5 January 2009 Water 
Services cancelled the irrigation Project Contract with Claimant. As 
this was the purpose of the Parties' Contract the breach of the delivery 
obligation substantially deprived Claimant of what it was entitled to expect 
under the Contract. At the time of the conclusion of the Contract as well 
as at the time of the Contract amendment respectively, Respondent 
must have foreseen this result. Fi"om the very beginning of negotiations 
Respondent was consulted in putting the bid for the project together. 
Likewise the very wording of the Contract (above [31]) made it clear that 
the pumps were to be used for the irrigation project. Furthermore, the 
importance of meeting the schedule was also clear to any reasonable 
person in the shoes of Respondent. In its email dated 25 June 2008 (above 
[30]) preceding the contract formation, by pointing out 'the importance of 
meeting the delivery date', Claimant had made it clear to Respondent 
that adherence to the delivery date was essential. The wording of the 
original Contract 'Delivery is to be ... effected by 15 December 2008' . 
(above [31]) must be seen in the light of the prior discussions between 
the Parties and the prior knowledge of Respondent. Thus, it indicates 
that the delivery date was of the essence of the Contract. Again, upon 
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the amendment of the contract after 1 August 2008 the above mentioned 
email by Claimant (above [33]) reiterated the importance in meeting the 
schedule. Hence, there was a fundamental breach of contract. 
[113] Claimant validly avoided the contract. In its email of 5 January 2009 
(above [47]) immediately after having learned that the Project Contract 
with Water Services had been cancelled, and before the pumps had 
actually been delivered, Claimant informed Respondent that it had no 
further use for the pumps and was forced to cancel the Contract. This 
constitutes a valid declaration of avoidance. 
[114] As the contract has been validly avoided according to Art. 81 (2) sentence 
1 CISG Claimant is entitled to restitution of the purchase price that has 
been paid to Respondent in the amount of US$1,214,550. According to 
Art. 84(1) CISG the seller is to pay interest on the purchase price to be 
refunded from the date an which the price was paid. The Parties have 
left it to the Tribunal to determine the interest rate after the Hearing at its 
discretion. lnterest an the purchase price is normally determined by the 
commercial investment rate prevailing at the seller's place of business 
(CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 9, Consequences of Avoidance of 
the Contract, Rule 3.4). The Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the 
relevant interest rate is to be set at 4% pa. After the Hearing it has been 
established that Respondent received payment of the purchase price an 
24 November 2008. The interest starts to run as of that date. 
2. Claimant's Right to Damages 
i115] Claimant asks for damages in the amount of US$320,000 since the irrigation 
Project Contract was cancelled by Water Services. Whereas Respondent 
does not dispute the original amount of loss incurred by Claimant the Parties 
disagree an whether Respondent is exempted from paying damages under 
Art. 79 CISG due to the fact that the shipping of the pumps was delayed 
because of the blockage of the Isthmus Canal. Furthermore, there is 
disagreement between the Parties whether- if damages are due - Claimant 
breached its obligation to mitigate lass under Art. 77 CISG. 
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i. Claimant's position 
[116] Primarily, Claimant denies that Respondent is exempted from liability for 
damages under Art. 79 CISG. lt argues that Respondent ought to have 
reasonably foreseen shipping delays at the time of the conclusion of 
the Contract as shipping delays account for most common supply chain 
disruptions and as delays had happened before. Furthermore, it argues 
that by agreeing to the DES Incoterms 2000 Respondent had assumed 
this risk, and did not disclaim it by introducing a force majeure clause 
into the Contract. Finally, Claimant alleges that Respondent could have 
avoided or overcome the impediment by either sourcing replacement 
pumps as early as 2 August 2008 from other companies, or sending the 
pumps in two separate shipments, or by sending the pumps by air cargo. 
[117] Further, Claimant alleges that it mitigated lasses by avoiding the contract 
in a timely manner and that there were no other measures available 
to further mitigate its lass suffered. Especially, it is Claimant's position 
that there was no substitute transaction available and that seeking an 
exception from the Military Council Office would not have been a viable 
option to reduce the lass sustained. 
ii. Respondent's position 
[118] lt is Respondent's position that under Art. 79 CISG it is exempted from 
paying damages because the accident in the Isthmus Canal constituted 
an impediment beyond its control which was not foreseeable and which 
could not have been avoided nor overcome. 
[119] First, Respondent argues that it did not assume the risk for shipping 
delays. lt alleges that the accident leading to the blockage of the Canal 
and thus the delay in delivering the pumps was caused by an unrelated 
third party, therefore being an impediment beyond Respondent's control. 
Second, Respondent emphasizes that it could not foresee the impediment 
although ships had been sometimes delayed in the Isthmus Canal. 
Third, it rejects any obligation to avoid or overcome the consequences· 
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by arranging for separate shipment, sending the pumps by air freight, 
taking a different raute or providing for pumps from another source. 
[120] Finally, even if it were liable in damages Respondent alleges that 
Claimant violated its obligation to mitigate its loss under Art. 77 CISG by 
not having requested separate shipment of the field pumps when they 
were ready on 30 October 2008, or alternatively, not having made a cover 
purchase or not having sought an exception to the prohibition under the 
28 December Decree from the Military Council. 
iii. The Tribunal's findings and decision 
[121] Having previouslyfound that Respondent breached its delivery obligation 
by only delivering the pumps on 6 January 2009 it follows that in principle 
Respondent is liable in damages for any lasses incurred by Claimant und er 
Art. 7 4 CISG. However, in the case at hand Respondent is exempted from 
liability for damages according to Art. 79 CISG. The delay in delivery was 
caused by an impediment beyond the control of Respondent that could 
not have been foreseen, nor avoided or overcome. 
[122] The blockage of the Isthmus Canal constituted an impediment beyond 
the control of Respondent. Although the Contract contained a DES 
Incoterms 2000 delivery clause, shipping the goods was not within the 
typical sphere of risk of Respondent. A manufacturer-seller's typical 
sphere of risk includes responsibility for its own sphere, such as for 
its financial capacity or for personal circumstances, procurement 
risk or liability for its own personnel ( Schwenzer, in Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer, Art. 79 [11 ]). There are no allegations that Respondent in 
one way or another chose an improper carrier or the like. Neither did 
Claimant argue that the carrier caused the delay, which might have 
negated Respondent's exemption under Art. 79(2) CISG, the carrier 
being a third person in the sense of this provision. The blockage of the 
Isthmus Canal that led to the delay was caused by a third person totally 
unrelated to Respondent and the Contract between the Parties. This 
is a typical impediment such as those caused by natural phenomena 
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and catastrophes (cf. Magnus, in Staudinger, Art. 79 [30]). Claimant's 
argument that by not insisting upon incorporating a force majeure clause 
into the Contract Respondent voluntarily assumed all transport risks is 
unavailing. Art. 79 CISG in essence leads to the very same results as 
a force majeure clause. Force majeure clauses regularly just specify 
what the Parties regard as being 'impediments' beyond the control of 
the obligor ( Schwenzer, in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, Art. 79 [57]; 
Brunner, UN-Kaufrecht - CISG: Kommentar zum Übereinkommen der 
Vereinten Nationen über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf 
von 1980, Unter Berücksichtigung der Schnittstellen zum internen 
Schweizer Recht, Bern: Stämpfli (2004), Art. 79 [46]). lf the Parties 
had wanted to hold Respondent liable for any and all events happening 
during transport of the goods they should have so provided in their 
Contract wh ich they d id not. 
[123] At the time of the conclusion of the Contract Respondent could not 
reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account. 
Although delays of ships that pass the Isthmus Canal have previously 
happened this has been a rare occurrence (above [39]). Claimant did 
not allege that there were special known risks involved with transport via 
the Isthmus Canal. Rather such rare occurrences may happen whatever 
mode or raute of transport is chosen; they do not have to be taken into 
account at the time of the conclusion of a contract. 
[124] Respondent was not obliged to avoid or overcome the consequences of 
the blockage of the Isthmus Canal and the resulting delay in delivering 
the pumps. Claimant firstly asserts that Respondent should have sourced 
replacement pumps as early as 2 August 2008 from other companies. 
However, this contradicts Claimant's own request. In its email dated 1 
August 2008 (above [35]) Claimant itself stated 'you will have to find 
steel from some other source in producing the pumps'. This shows 
that Claimant still wanted Respondent to produce the pumps itself. As 
previously found the Parties modified the original Contract but it was 
still presumed that Respondent should manufacture the pumps itself. 
Had Respondent delivered pumps from another manufacturer this would 
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have been a breach of contract on its part for which it could have been 
liable. Thus, Respondent could not be expected to source replacement 
pumps from another supplier. 
[125] The same considerations apply to Claimant's argument that Respondent 
should have sent the pumps in two separate shipments. The Contract 
provided for 'a single shipment' (above [31]). When modifying the Contract 
the Parties did not touch this clause. Thus, it was not only Respondent's 
right to effect delivery in one single shipment, rather it was its obligation 
to do so. Had Respondent shipped the first part of the pumps Claimant 
even would have had the right to reject such a partial delivery. lf Claimant 
wanted separate delivery of those pumps which would be ready on 30 
October 2008 it should have suggested to modify the Contract accordingly 
which it did not. 
[126] Neither could Respondent be expected to avoid the consequences of the 
impediment by sending the pumps by air cargo. Again, the Contract itself 
called for transport by ship, DES Incoterms 2000 standing for 'Delivered 
Ex Ship'. Upon modification of the Contract Claimant did not mention 
a possible modification of the mode of shipment. Thus, Respondent 
would have breached its delivery obligation by choosing another mode 
of transport. Furthermore, when Respondent shipped the pumps on 22 
November 2008 it could expect them to arrive at Capitol City around 22 
December 2008 which would have sufficed for Claimant to truck them to 
the project site in Oceania in sufficient time to meet Claimant's Project 
Contract dates. The blockage of the Isthmus Canal did not occur until 
28 November 2008, when the vessel with the pumps was already on the 
open sea. At that time, however, it was too late to arrange for any other 
kind of shipment. 
[127] In conclusion, Respondent could neither foresee the impediment 
nor could it avoid or overcome it or its consequences. Therefore, 
Respondent is exempted from liability for damages according to Art. 79 
CISG. 
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[128] As Respondent is exempted from liability for damages under Art. 79 
CISG there is no need to further discuss any reduction or exclusion 
of damages due to a possible breach by Claimant of its obligation to 
mitigate loss under Art. 77 CISG. 
VIII. Costs 
[129] According to Art. 39 ACICA Rules the Arbitral Tribunal shall fix the costs 
of arbitration. These costs include the fees of the Arbitral Tribunal, 
ACICA's registration fee and administration fee as well as several other 
items and legal and other costs incurred by the successful party to the 
extent that the Tribunal has determined the amount of such costs to be 
reasonable. 
[130] The costs of the present arbitration as relates to the fees of the Arbitral 
Tribunal, ACICA's registration fee and administration fee as well as 
several other items are set by theArbitral Tribunal at US$120,000 [details 
omitted]. 
[131] Each of the Parties has made submissions with respect to their own 
costs [details omitted]. As concerns Claimant according to Art. 39(e) 
ACICA Rules the Arbitral Tribunal has determined that an amount of 
US$120,000 is reasonable [details omitted]. 
[132] Each Party has requested the Arbitral Tribunal to order the other Party 
to reimburse it for its costs in full and to bear all expenses of the Arbitral 
Tribunal and the ACICA administrative fees. 
[133] According toArt. 41.1 ACICARules, the costs of arbitration shall in principle 
be borne by the unsuccessful party. The Arbitral Tribunal may, however, 
apportion each of such costs between the parties if it determines that 
apportionment is reasonable. As Claimant has prevailed on the issues 
of jurisdiction and avoidance of the Contract, and is therefore entitled to 
reimbursement of the purchase price, and Respondent is exempted from 
liability to pay damages, the Tribunal finds it fair and just to allocate the· 
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costs with Respondent bearing 90% and Claimant bearing 10% of these 
costs. In light of the above and in accordance with Art. 41.2 ACICA Rules 
the Arbitral Tribunal finds it reasonable to order Respondent to reimburse 
80% of Claimant's legal and other costs. 
IX. Summary of Findings 
[1 ~4] In summary, the Tribunal has made the following findings which, together 
with the reasons therefore, are set forth in full in the preceding sections 
of this Award: 
(a) The Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the dispute between 
Claimant and Respondent; 
(b) Respondent breached the Contract by only delivering the pumps 
on 6 January 2009; 
(c) This amounted to a fundamental breach; 
( d) Claimant rightfully and properly avoided the contract; 
(e) Claimant is entitled to a reimbursement of the purchase price in 
the amount of US$1,214,550; 
(f) Claimant is entitled to interest on this sum from 24 November 
2008 at the rate of 4% pa; 
(g) Respondent is exempted from liability to pay damages; 
(h) The costs of arbitration fixed at US$ 120,000 shall be borne 
90% by Respondent and 10% by Claimant; and 
(i) Respondent shall reimburse Claimant 80% of its legal and other 
costs fixed at US$ 120,000. 
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X. Award 
[135] Having carefully considered all of the evidence and submissions placed 
before it, and for the reasons set out above, the Tribunal finally decides, 
determines, finds and awards as follows: 
(a) Respondent shall pay Claimant US$1 ,214,550 plus interest at 
a rate of four percent per annum accruing from 24 November 
2008 until the day of full payment. 
(b) The costs of arbitration fixed at US$120,000 are tobe borne by 
Respondent in the amount of US$108,000 and Claimant in the 
amount of US$12,000. 
(c) Respondent shall pay Claimant US$ 96,000 as contribution to 
Claimant's legal costs and expenses being 80% of its legal and 
other costs fixed at US$120,000. 
(d) All other claims are dismissed. 
[136] The Tribunal is most grateful to counsel to the Parties for their 
professionalism and good cooperation in this interesting arbitration. 
Place of Arbitration: Vindobona, Danubia 
Date: 5 December 2012 
Signatures: 
Prof Dr Ingeborg Schwenzer, LL.M. 
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